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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
JEFF MICHELSON, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

)(
)(

)(
)(
)(
)(
)(

Plaintiffs,
v.

copy

Civil Action File No. 2007CV137612
BC2

CUMULUS MEDIA INC., LEWIS W.
)(
DICKEY JR., HOLCOMBE T. GREEN, JR )(
ERIC ROBISON, RALPH B. EVERETT, )(
ROBERT H. SHERIDAN, III and
)(
MERRILL LYNCH GLOBAL
)(
PRIVATE EQUITY,
)(

)(
)(

Defendants.

~~====~--~~~~~---)(
PAUL COWLES, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

v.

)(
)(

)(
)(
)(
)(
)(

Civil Action File No. 2007CV139383
BC2

CUMULUS MEDIA INC., LEWIS W.
)(
DICKEY JR., HOLCOMBE T. GREEN, JR)(
ERIC ROBISON, RALPH B. EVERETT, )(
ROBERT H. SHERIDAN, III and
)(
MERRILL LYNCH GLOBAL
)(
PRIVATE EQUITY,
)(

)(
)(
-------------------------)(
Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
On April 28, 2009, counsel appeared before this Court to present oral argument on
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. After reviewing the briefs filed on the Motion, the pleadings,
and the arguments presented by counsel, the Court hereby finds as follows:
I. FACTS
This case was filed in Fulton County Superior Court during the summer of 2007, and
removed to Federal District Court in July, 2008. In Federal Court, Defendants filed Motions to
Dismiss. On February 12, 2009, Judge Evans of the Northern District of Georgia issued two
separate opinions denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss under SLUSA and remanding the
1

remaining issues to Fulton County Superior Court. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the
Business Court and scheduled for hearing on the remaining issues in Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss.

l

This case anses out of a proposed management-led buyout of Cumulus headed by
Defendant Lewis W. Dickey, Jr., CEO and Chairman ofthe Cumulus Board ("Dickey"). In July,
2007, Cumulus announced a merger (the "Proposed Merger"), between it and the buyout group
which consisted of Dickey, his family, and Merrill Lynch (the "Buyout Group").
Cumulus has a five member Board of Directors, four of whom are outside directors who
were not interested in the Proposed Merger: Holcombe T. Green, Jr., Eric Robison, Ralph B.
Everett, and Robert H. Sheridan III (collectively the "Outside Directors"). The fifth member is
Dickey, who, together with his family, controls between 35-50% of the voting shares depending
upon whether outstanding stock options are counted in the total or not.
Plaintiffs filed their respective suits to enjoin the Proposed Merger.

In May, 2008,

Cumulus announced that the Proposed Merger was terminated. Cumulus then entered into a
termination agreement with the Buyout Group that resulted in a $15 million payment to Cumulus
and a release of all claims against the members of the Buyout Group.
Plaintiffs amended and restated their Complaints to include allegations of waste, failure of
oversight, and self-dealing transactions. Plaintiffs have identified the Amended Complaint in the
Michelson matter, Civil Action No. 2007CV137612, to serve as the operative pleading for both
cases (the "Operative Complaint"). Plaintiffs' Operative Complaint no longer seeks to enjoin the
Proposed Merger, but alleges that the Director Defendants, under the direction of Dickey, took
measures to artificially decrease the price of the stock in order to facilitate the Proposed Merger,
and then after the Proposed Merger was terminated, to facilitate a potential future merger,

I Defendant Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity had filed a Motion to Dismiss, but withdrew its Motion on April
21,2009. This Court's order will therefore focus solely on the Director Defendants.
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possibly with the same buyer. Plaintiffs allege that the Outside Directors are controlled by
Dickey because he hand-selected them and controls a significant block of the Company.
Plaintiffs allege that the Outside Directors' approval of transactions that benefited Dickey, but
harmed shareholders, is evidence of Dickey's control over them.
II. CUMULUS MOTION TO DISMISS

The parties agree that Delaware law applies to this Motion.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-747

("[A]ny derivative proceeding in the right of a foreign corporation ... shall be governed by the
laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign corporation."); Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1991); Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., Architects & Planners,
Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735-736 (1985).
A party seeking a motion to dismiss brought under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted must demonstrate that plaintiff's allegations in the
complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state
of provable facts asserted in support thereof. Common Cause/Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 279
Ga. 480, 481 (2005). "On a motion to dismiss pursuant to [a plea of demand futility], the Court
considers the same documents, similarly accepts well-pled allegations as true, and makes
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs-all as it does in considering a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6)." Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961,976 (Del. Ch. 2003) aff'd 845 A.2d 1040
(Del. 2004).
Defendants assert that the Operative Complaint should be dismissed for failure to make first
a demand upon the Cumulus Board or to demonstrate demand futility as required under
Delaware law. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,806 (Del. 1984). "The purpose of the demand
requirement is not to insulate defendants from liability; rather, the demand requirement and the
strict requirements of factual particularity under Rule 23.1 exist to preserve the primacy of board
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decisionmaking regarding legal claims belonging to the corporation." In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d
106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Plaintiffs concede that demand was not made, but assert that they have sufficiently alleged
demand futility by pleading particularized facts demonstrating that a majority of the Board at the
time the Operative Complaint was filed could not have fairly and impartially evaluated a
demand. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 (Del. 2008). The Delaware Supreme Court instructs
trial courts to view the alleged demand futility facts in a light favorable to plaintiffs. Beam v.
Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004). Directors, however, are entitled to a presumption that
they would have acted faithful to their fiduciary duties if presented with a demand. Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 806,812 (Del. 1984).
Demand futility is evaluated under two standards: the Aronson and Rales tests. "The
Aronson test applies to claims involving a contested transaction i.e., where it is alleged that the
directors made a conscious business decision in breach of their fiduciary duties. Aronson, 473
A.2d 806. That test requires that the plaintiff allege particularized facts creating a reason to
doubt that (1) the directors are disinterested and independent, or (2) the challenged transaction
was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Wood v. Baum, 953
A.2d136, 140 (Del. 2008) (citing Aronson). Rales, on the other hand, applies where the subject
of the derivative suit is not a decision of the Board of Directors, but rather a violation of their
oversight duties. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). The Rales test requires that the
plaintiff allege particularized facts establishing a reason to doubt that "the board of directors
could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding
to a demand." Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008). The Aronson test applies to
Plaintiffs' allegations that the Director Defendants took certain corporate actions (i.e., approval
of executive compensation plan, approval ofthe stock repurchase plan) and the Rales test applies
to Plaintiffs' oversight claims. "To satisfy either test, a plaintiff must comply with stringent
4

requirements of factual particularity" as is required under Delaware law. Wood v. Baum, 953
A.2d at 14l.
A. Lack of Disinterest and Independence to Establish Demand Futility

Plaintiffs allege that demand would have been futile because under a totality of
circumstances it is apparent that Dickey exercised dominion and control over the Outside
Directors in such a manner as to negate their independence, and satisfy demand futility under
both Aronson and Rales. They argue that the only reasonable conclusion based upon all of the
challenged transactions is for the Court to find demand futility. See Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d
222, 229 (Del. Ch. 1990) ("[T]he question is whether the accumulation of all factors creates the
reasonable doubt to which Aronson refers."); cf. Khanna v. McMinn, 2006 WL 1388744,
*14 (Del. Ch. 2006) ("Demand futility [analysis] ... is fact-intensive and proceeds director-bydirector and transaction-by-transaction.").
Plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading facts sufficient to form a "reasonable doubt" as to the
independence or lack of interest of a majority of the Outside Directors. Beam v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004). Interest and independence are two separate bases upon which to
review a director's bias. Interest "requires an analysis of whether the director is disinterested in
the underlying transaction ... " Id. at 1049. The independence analysis is a fact-specific inquiry
to determine whether the directors were capable of independently making a business decision
with regard to the demand. Id. at 1049-1050.
Plaintiffs' allegations of demand futility specific to the Outside Directors and the challenged
transactions are discussed below.
1.

Plaintiffs' Allegations Regarding the Independence of the Outside Directors

Plaintiffs assert that the Board of Directors is dominated and controlled by Dickey (and his
family), and that the Board approved transactions in breach of their fiduciary duties as a result of
this control. Plaintiffs dispute the independence of the Outside Directors because Dickey "hand
5

picked" them. Additionally, Plaintiffs highlight the Outside Director's long record of service
with the Board as evidence that the Outside Directors are beholden to Dickey (Everett and
Sheridan since 1998, Robison since 1999, and Green since 2001). Plaintiffs also allege that the
Outside Directors could not have properly considered a demand that would have resulted in their
own personal liability. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Outside Directors' approval of the
challenged transactions, as described below, is evidence of Dickey's control over them.

In addition to these allegations against all of the Outside Directors, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant Robison lacked independence because he received additional compensation (up to
$59,000 per year) pursuant to a separate consulting contract with Cumulus.

2.

Plaintiffs' Allegations Regarding the Challenged Transactions
a.

Cumulus Media Partners Transfer

Plaintiffs point to the 2006 transfer of certain Houston and Kansas City radio stations to
Cumulus Media Partners LLC ("CMP"), a company of which Dickey was later named CEO, as
evidence of a interested transaction (for Dickey) that was approved by the Outside Directors.
Plaintiffs allege that this transaction drove down Cumulus' stock price and set the stage for the
low-bid merger offer from the Buyout Group led by Dickey.

b.

Proposed Merger

Plaintiffs also point to the Proposed Merger with the Buyout Group as another example of an
interested transaction (for Dickey) that was approved by the Outside Directors. Plaintiffs allege
that the stock price was artificially deflated, and therefore, the "premium" per-share price offered
was no bargain for Cumulus shareholders. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the termination fee
of $15 million set in the Proposed Merger agreement was too high and deterred other offers.

In response to the Buyout Group merger offer, the Cumulus Board formed a special
committee comprised of three ofthe Outside Directors (the "Special Committee"), which
retained independent counsel, obtained an independent expert valuation report, negotiated for an
6

increased per-share offer price generating a net increase of $42 million to the purchase price, and
negotiated a 45-day go-shop provision to test the offer price on the market.
When the Proposed Merger was terminated, the Buyout Group paid the $15 million
termination fee to Cumulus and entered into a termination agreement with Cumulus, which
included a release ofliability of the Buyout Group. In addition, the members of the Buyout
Group entered into a separate termination agreement to which Cumulus was not a party. The
second termination agreement essentially granted the parties a right of first refusal in future
merger attempts with Cumulus. Plaintiffs complain that the release of liability obtained by the
Buyout Group in the termination agreement is evidence of Dickey's control over the Outside
Directors. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Cumulus is a de facto party to the second
termination agreement as a result of the Dickey family's control over the company.

c.

Amendments to Credit Facility Agreement

Plaintiffs allege that certain Cumulus credit agreements were amended with unfavorable
terms in order to facilitate the Proposed Merger. Defendants respond that such amendments
were only effective, however, lithe Proposed Merger was completed, which it was not.

d.

Cumulus Stock Repurchase Plan

Plaintiffs allege that the Board's decision to undertake a campaign to buy-back up to $75
million of the company's stock resulted in increasing Dickey's control over Cumulus, and
therefore, the Board as a whole. Defendants point to the absence of particularized allegations
that the Outside Directors acted with such a motive. 2

Defendants urge the Court to consider a January, 2009 Voting Agreement entered into between the Dickey family
and Cumulus which, retroactive to June, 2008, prevents the Dickey family from voting any increase in their control
as a result of the buy-back program. Because this agreement was not in place at the time of the filing of the
Operative Complaint, the Court will not consider this point. Similarly, the Court will not consider Plaintiffs'
allegations related to the October, 2008 Cumulus Equity Incentive Plan.
2
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e.

Open Market Stock Repurchase

Plaintiffs also complain that the Dickey family's purchase of Cumulus stock on the open
market at a depressed stock price, increased the Dickey family's voting control over Cumulus
and is further evidence that they shaped company policy for their own benefit. Defendants call
the Court's attention to the fact that the Cumulus Board took no action with regard to the Dickey
family's purchase of stock on the open market, nor could they have prevented the purchases.

f.

Executive Compensation

Plaintiffs assert that Dickey and his brother, John Dickey, Co-Chief Operating Officer,
received excessive compensation as set by the Compensation Committee composed of Robison,
Green, and Sheridan. Plaintiffs argue that the inequity between John Dickey's compensation and
that received by the other Co-Chief Operating Officer demonstrates the control that the Dickey
family exerts over the Board. 3 Additionally, Plaintiffs characterize Dickey's compensation
package as "excessive.,,4 Defendants countered that Plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts
establishing that the compensation paid to the Dickey brothers was so excessive that it was
beyond the scope of the business judgment rule presumption that the Directors acted reasonably.

3.

Analysis of Independence and Disinterest for Demand Futility

Plaintiffs have failed to plead particularized facts sufficient to demonstrate that a majority of
the Outside Directors lacked independence or were interested in the transactions in order to
excuse demand under either the Aronson or Rales tests. The Operative Complaint is devoid of
allegations that the Outside Directors were "interested" in any of the complained of transactions.
Similarly, there is insufficient evidence of bias-producing relationships between Dickey and the

3 John Dickey, Co-Chief Operating Officer was awarded 60,000 common shares (value of $590,400), which was
four times what Mr. Pinch, the other Co-Chief Operating Officer, was awarded (value of$196,800). During this
time, Mr. Dickey received a salary of $570,000 and Mr. Pinch received a salary of $505,000.
4 In 2006, Lewis Dickey received $825,000 in salary and $3.4 million in stock awards. In 2007, Lewis Dickey
received $901,250 in salary, $8.5 million in stock awards, and $185,000 in non-equity incentive plan.
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Outside Directors so that Dickey's interest in the Proposed Merger (and the other complained of
transactions) taints the four Outside Directors. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del.
2004) ("[T]o render a director unable to consider a demand, a relationship must be of a bias
producing nature. Allegations of mere personal friendship or a mere outside business
relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director's
independence.") .
In Beam v. Stewart, the Delaware Supreme Court evaluated demand futility where the
company founder, CEO, and Board Chairwoman-Martha Stewart-controlled over 94% ofthe
company. 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). The plaintiffs in Beam alleged demand futility because
of Stewart's control over the company and her close business and personal relationship with the
other directors. Despite Stewart's ability to "remove or replace any or all of the Directors" at
will, news articles confirming personal friendships between Stewart and certain Board members,
and acknowledgment that Stewart traveled in the same social circles as the directors, the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that a majority ofthe Board was
uninterested and independent for purposes of considering demand. Id. at 1047-1051.
In this case, the Dickey family controls a majority of the voting interests in Cumulus, but
much less than that held by Martha Stewart. Additionally, while Plaintiffs allege that the Outside
Directors were beholden to Dickey, there are no particularized allegations to support such a
conclusion other than the argument that they approved transactions which benefited Dickey and
his family. Additionally, a mere threat of personal liability in a derivative suit is insufficient to
render a Director interested for purposes of demand futility as Plaintiffs allege. In re Citigroup
Inc., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 943 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Plaintiffs' general allegations against the Outside Directors do not provide particularized facts
sufficient to infer interest or lack of independence necessary to excuse demand. Beam, 845 A.2d
1040.
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Turning to the allegation against Robison, individually, the Court finds that the compensation
he received for consulting services in 2007 is under the NASDAQ threshold of $1 00,000 for
determining director independence. SEC Release No. 34-58029. Additionally, Robison
performed no consulting services for Cumulus in 2008 and, therefore, received no additional
compensation in that year. Thus, he was not acting in that capacity at the time that demand could
have been made. The Court finds that he was sufficiently disinterested and independent, along
with the other Outside Directors to consider properly a demand made by Plaintiffs.
Similarly, the challenged transactions in this case do not demonstrate the lack of
independence and disinterest sufficient to excuse demand. The CMP transaction had potential
long-term value for the company, which Plaintiffs have conceded. The Outside Directors took
appropriate measures with regard to their consideration of the Proposed Merger (i.e., special
committee, independent counsel, price negotiations, etc.). Any possible harm to result from the
Proposed Merger is mooted by its termination, including the allegedly unfavorable credit
agreement amendments. Approval of the stock repurchase plan, without more, is insufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt regarding the independence or disinterest of the Outside Directors. See
CA Public Employees' Retirement System v. Coulter, 2002 WL 31888343, at *8 (Del. Ch.
2002). Plaintiffs' allegations regarding executive compensation do not exceed the "outer limits"
of board discretion and warrant a conclusion of lack of independence. See In re Citigroup, 964
A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009). Finally, Plaintiffs fail to plead specific allegations that the four
Outside Directors either had personal interests in the challenged transactions or that they had an
improper motive in approving such transactions.

B. Breach of the Duty of Loyalty to Establish Demand Futility
Like many other corporations, Cumulus' Articles ofIncorporation contain an exculpatory
provision that exculpates any Director from personal liability for violations of fiduciary duties,
except for breaches of the duty of loyalty or intentional acts of misconduct. Thus, in order to
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rebut the business judgment rule for purposes of demand futility, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which requires that the Director Defendants acted with
intent to harm, fraud, or a conscious disregard of a known duty to act. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d
at 141; In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Plaintiffs concede that the Operative Complaint is not based upon any allegations of fraud.
Plaintiffs allege that the Outside Directors' service on key management committees such as the
Audit, Compensation, and Special Committees gave them first-hand knowledge that the
challenged transactions were not in the best interest of Cumulus. Plaintiffs have failed, however,
to allege particularized facts that the Outside Directors acted with intent to harm or a conscious
disregard of their fiduciary duties sufficient for this Court to find a likely breach of the fiduciary
duty ofloyalty. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d at 142-143; In re Caremark Int'l Inc., Deriv. Litig.,
698 A.23d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
C. Corporate Waste to Establish Demand Futility

Plaintiffs allege in the Operative Complaint that the CMP transaction and executive
compensation paid to Dickey and his brother, John Dickey, amounted to corporate waste. Proof
of corporate waste, under Delaware law, has a very high threshold requiring that a plaintiff
demonstrate that a board's actions were egregious or irrational.
Delaware law provides stringent requirements for a plaintiff to
state a claim for corporate waste, and to excuse demand on
grounds of waste the Complaint must allege particularized facts
that lead to a reasonable inference that the director defendants
authorized an exchange that is so one sided that no business person
of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation
has received adequate consideration.
In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d l06, 136. Because Plaintiffs conceded that the CMP transaction could
lead to substantial revenue increases in the long term, it cannot qualify as waste of corporate
assets. Similarly, the allegations regarding executive compensation are insufficient to meet the
stringent standard for corporate waste.
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III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED this ---"--'---

----L-~r==----_I_--, 2009.

Copies to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jeff Michelson
Steven J. Estep, Esq.
Cohen Cooper Estep & Whitman
3350 Riverwood Parkway, Suite 2220
Atlanta, GA 30339
sestep@mindspring.com
Marc M. Umeda, Esq.
Brian J. Robbins, Esq.
George A. Aguilar, Esq.
Steven J. Simerlein, Esq.
Rebecca A. Peterson, Esq.
Robbins Umeda & Fink
610 West Ash St., Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
mumeda@robbinsumeda.com
brobbins@robbinsumeda.com
gaguilar@robbinsumeda.com
ssimerlein@robbinsumeda.com
rpeterson@robbinsumeda.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Paul Cowles
Corey D. Holzer, Esq.
Michael 1. Fistel, Jr., Esq.
Holzer Holzer & Fistel LLC
200 Ashford Center North
Suite 300
Atlanta, Georgia 30338
cholzer@holzerlaw.com
mfistel@holzerlaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendants
Attorneys for Defendants cumulus Media, Holcombe T. Green, Jr., Eric P. Robison, Ralph
B. Everett and Robert H. Sheridan, III
Rocco E. Testani, Esq.
Molley J. Clarkson, Esq.
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan
999 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-3996
rocco. testani@sutherland.com
molley.clarkson@sutherland.com

Attorney for Defendant Lewis W. Dickey, Jr.
Michael J. McConnell, Esq.
Joseph E. Finley, Esq.
Walter W. Davis, Esq.
Jones Day
1429 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 800
Atlanta, GA 30309-3053
mmcconnell@jonesday.com
jfinley@jonesday.com
wwdavis@jonesday.com

Attorneys for Defendant Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity
Richard H. Sinkfield, Esq.
Dan F. Laney, Esq.
Rogers & Hardin
229 Peachtree St., N.E.
2700 International Tower
Atlanta, GA 30303
rsinkfield@rh-law.com
dlaney@rh-law.com

Paul J. Lockwood, Esq.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
One Rodney Square
P.O. Box 636
Wilmington, DE 19899
paul.lockwood@skadden.com
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